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Recent Developments

Noble v. Bruce

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland unanimously
held in Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md.
730, 709 A.2d 1264 (1998), that an
attorney is not liable to a testator's
beneficiaries in a malpractice
action for providing negligent
estate planning advice to a testator
or for negligently drafting a will.
Rejecting the balancing-factors
theory and the third-party
beneficiary theory, the court relied
upon the strict privity-rule, which
states that an attorney is not liable
to non-clients for negligence in the
absence of privity or a duty to
them. Consequently, beneficiaries
will be unable to sue the testator's
attorney for malpractice even if the
attorney was negligent.
The decision in Noble v. Bruce
was the result of two consolidated
cases: Noble v. Bruce and
Fauntleroy v. Blizzard. In Noble,
Mr. and Mrs. Long retained
Charles A. Bruce, Jr. ("Bruce") to
prepare their wills. Bruce prepared
reciprocal wills for the Longs, who
had substantial assets. The wills
did not provide for a "by-pass"
trust, which would have enabled
the Longs to shelter 1.2 million
dollars from federal estate taxes.
After .Mr. and Mrs. Long died,
the beneficiaries of the Longs'
estates sued Bruce in the Circuit
Court for Somerset County
alleging that he was negligent in
failing to provide tax-planning
advice to the Longs.
Bruce
asserted in an affidavit that he did
inform the Longs of the tax
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implications, but that the Longs
did not wish to part with control of
their assets during their lifetimes.
Bruce filed a motion for summary
judgment, which was granted by
the circuit court. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed,
stating
that
the
beneficiaries lacked standing to
sue Bruce.
The beneficiaries
appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland.
In Fauntleroy, Ms. Jackson,
the testator, retained T. Houghlett
Henry, Jr. ("Henry") to prepare her
will. Ms. Jackson bequeathed
stock in Pittsburgh Des Moines
Steel Company ("PDM") to the
children and grandchildren of her
brother-in-law. The will directed
that all taxes were to be paid out of

the residuary estate.
Henry
subsequently sent Ms. Jackson a
letter stating that the PDM stock
would pay its own taxes as they
discussed. At her death in 1994,
Ms. Jackson owned, in addition to
other property, 1.4 million dollars
worth ofPDM stock, and the estate
and inheritance taxes totaled
$910,000. In accordance with the
provisions of the will, the taxes
were borne by the residuary
legatees, the Fauntleroys.
The Fauntleroys brought suit in
the Circuit Court for Talbot
County against Henry's estate
alleging that Henry was negligent
in preparing the will, specifically,
in providing that the taxes were to
be paid from the residuary estate
instead of from the proceeds of the
sale of the stock. Henry's estate
filed a motion to dismiss, which
was
granted
because
the
beneficiaries lacked standing to
sue. The Fauntleroys appf(aled to
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland and filed a petition for
writ of certiorari to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, which was
granted.
In these consolidated cases, the
issue before the Court of Appeals
of Maryland was whether an
attorney is liable in a malpractice
action to non-client, third parties
for providing negligent estate
planning advice or for negligently
drafting a will. Noble, 349 Md. at
733, 709 A.2d at 1266.
In
reaching its decision, the court
evaluated three approaches applied
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in attorney malpractice actions for
negligent estate planning: the
balancing-factors theory; the thirdparty beneficiary theory; and the
strict-privity rule. Id at 738, 709
A.2d at 1268.
Under the balancing-factors
theory, the court considered "'the
extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the
foreseeability of harm to him, the
degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered mJury, the
closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct
and the injury, and the policy of
preventing future harm. '" Id. at
743, 709 A.2d at 1271 (quoting
Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,687
(Cal. 1961)). The court dismissed
the balancing-factors theory as
overly broad and unworkable. Id.
at 744, 709 A.2d at 127l.
N ext, the court discussed the
third-party beneficiary theory.
This theory is premised upon the
existence of a duty between the
attorney and the non-client. Id. at
746, 709 A.2d at 1272 (citing
Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md.
116, 134, 492 A.2d 618, 627
(1985)). An attorney will owe a
duty to the non-client if, as a direct
result of the transaction, the client
intended to benefit the non-client.
Id at 747, 709 A.2d at 1272.
(quoting Flaherty, 303 Md. at
130-31, 492 A.2d at 625).
Therefore, once the non-client
establishes that the attorney owed
him a duty, he must prove the
remaining elements of negligence.
Id at 747, 709 A.2d at 1273 (citing
Flaherty, 303 Md. at 131, 492
A.2d at 625).

The court rejected the thirdparty
beneficiary
theory,
articulating several reasons why
the third-party beneficiary theory
did not apply in these cases. First,
neither' attorney was retained by
the testators to provide estateplanning advice on behalf of the
beneficiaries. Id at 752-53, 709
A.2d at 1276. Second, the client's
intent to benefit the non-client
must be a direct purpose of the
transaction or relationship. Id. at
754, 709 A.2d at 1276. The
beneficiary of the will is not
necessarily the beneficiary of the
attorney-client relationship. Id. In
the cases before the court, the
testators intended to benefit
themselves in planning their
estates by retaining Bruce and
Henry. Id. As a result, the
beneficiaries of the wills were not
third-party beneficiaries. Id.
The court further noted that
Maryland courts generally apply
the strict-privity test in attorney
malpractice cases. Id. at 738, 709
A.2d at 1268 (citing Wlodarek v.
Thrift, 178 Md. 453,468, 13 A.2d
774, 481 (1940)). The court
followed the rule of Nat 'I Savings
Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 20506 (1879), which held that a party
not in privity with the attorney
may not maintain a negligence
action against the attorney. Noble,
349 Md. at 738, 709 A.2d at 1268.
To maintain a cause of action for
negligence or malpractice against
an attorney, the plaintiff must
prove the following: "1) the
attorney's employment; 2) his
neglect of a reasonable duty; and
3) loss to the client proximately

caused by the neglect of duty." Id.
at 739, 709 A.2d at 1269 (citing
Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606,
611-12,31 A.2d 312,315 (1943)).
Thus, in the absence of a duty
between the attorney and the third
party, the third party may not
maintain a negligence claim
against the attorney. Id. (quoting
Flaherty, 303 Md. at 134, 492
A.2d at 627).
To determine if a duty exists,
the court will consider the
relationship between the parties
and the nature of the harm that
could result from the lack of
ordinary care.
Id. (quoting
Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307
Md. 527, 534-35, 515 A.2d 756,
759-60 (1986)). Courts generally
will find that no duty exists where
the harm is purely economic and
no privity exists between the
parties. Id. at 740, 709 A.2d 1269
(citing Jacques, 309 Md. at 537,
515 A.2d at 761).
The court noted that public
policy, such as the duty of loyalty
to the client, conflict of interest
between the testator and the
beneficiaries,
and
unlimited
liability to third parties justifies the
strict-privity rule. Id. at 741-42,
709 A.2d at 1270. Thus, the
attorney-client relationship will
sustain an undue burden if a rule
other than the strict-privity rule
was adopted. Id. at 742, 709 A.2d
at 1270. The court held that the
strict-privity rule applies in this
case;
consequently,
the
beneficiaries can not maintain a
cause of action against the
attorneys because no employment
relationship existed between the
29.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 65
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attorneys and the beneficiaries. Id.
at 752, 709 A.2d at 1275.
In Noble v. Bruce, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that a
third party not in privity with the
attorney may not maintain a legal
malpractice action against the
attorney. With the adoption ofthe
strict-privity rule in attorney
malpractice actions, the court of
appeals adopted a bright-line test,
which effectively denies a cause of
action to all beneficiaries who the
attorney did not represent. The
adoption of such a bright-line test
is unquestionably harsh to the
innocent beneficiaries because the
testator almost certainly intended
to benefit these individuals. The
faulty drafting of a will or the
negligent planning advice given to
a testator could indeed deprive the
beneficiaries of what the testator
intended for them to have. Yet,
the beneficiaries are seemingly
without recourse.
The court,
however, did not foreclose the
possibility that the testator's estate
may stand in the shoes of the
testator and meet the strict-privity
test. Thus, the testator or the
testator's estate might have a cause
of action against the attorney for
negligence, but damages may be
limited to attorney's fees.
Regardless of the apparent
harshness of this rule, a bright-line
test is nonetheless necessary for
several reasons. First, without a
bright-line
test,
disgruntled
beneficiaries will bring a flood of
litigation. Second, all parties to a
transaction will know that unless
an employment relationship exists,
non-clients cannot maintain a
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cause of action for professional
malpractice. Third, the strictprivity test protects the attorneyclient relationship by ensuring that
the attorney will act with complete
loyalty to his client.
The
attorney's attention will thus be
directed fully to the needs of his
client and he will not have to
balance the needs of the
beneficiaries or fear liability from
third parties. Fourth, a lawyer can
represent his client zealously
without having to fear a conflict of
interest between his client and the
beneficiaries. Finally, the strictprivity rule ensures that when the
lawyer undertakes to represent a
client, the lawyer will know
exactly to whom potential liability
could extend.

